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1443 
Isolated Wetland Commons and the Constitution 
 
Blake Hudson* and Mike Hardig** 
ABSTRACT 
 
Isolated wetlands provide great ecological and economic 
value to the United States. While some states provide protection 
for isolated wetlands, a great many do not. These wetlands are 
also left outside the ambit of federal wetland regulatory 
protections under the Clean Water Act, with its murky 
jurisdictional reach. Notwithstanding jurisdictional questions 
under current federal statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court has gone 
so far as to call into question the constitutionality of federal 
isolated wetland regulation. This Article makes a normative 
argument that, in the absence of state or local programs 
providing holistic isolated wetland protection, federal action is 
needed. The Article further provides the legal foundation—
despite doubts manifested by the nation’s highest court—for the 
constitutionality of federal isolated wetlands regulation. This 
legal foundation is based upon commons analysis, which ties 
developers of isolated wetlands engaged in interstate commerce 
to those wetlands within a single act of appropriation. Such acts 
of appropriation are economic transactions that in the aggregate 
substantially affect interstate commerce—thus meeting one of the 
tests established by the Supreme Court for determining the 
constitutionality of federal legislation. 
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[T]he sort of isolation being considered is a political concept, not a 
scientifically demonstrated reality.1 
For the environmental lawyer, the term “isolated wetlands” may 
immediately call to mind the “abandoned gravel pit” in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers.2 To be certain, the isolated wetland at the bottom of that 
pit became a migratory bird rest stop and served important 
ecological functions. But the pit has also become a rather misleading 
symbol of the importance of isolated wetlands to the nation, and the 
debate regarding how far the federal government’s Commerce 
Clause authority extends over land use regulation with supposedly 
tenuous connections to interstate commerce. The diverse types of 
isolated wetlands across the country are far from the stereotype of 
abandoned gravel pits and provide a wide variety of environmental 
and aesthetic values. These wetlands are of equal importance to the 
nation’s long-term environmental and economic well-being as 
wetlands with a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters—
the key jurisdictional prerequisite for federal authority over wetland 
development arising out of the Clean Water Act (CWA).3 
The most recent significant Supreme Court cases assessing 
federal jurisdiction over wetlands, SWANCC and Rapanos v. United 
 
 1. Allen E. Plocher et al., Importance of Small Isolated Wetlands, ILL. NAT. HIST. SURV. 
REP. 1, 1 (Mar. 2003) (citing RALPH W. TINER, IN SEARCH OF SWAMPLAND: A WETLAND 
SOURCEBOOK AND FIELD GUIDE (1998)). Others have framed the question as: 
Why is there a bias against protecting small, isolated wetlands? The critical 
biological question is whether small wetlands are expendable, and the 
fundamental issue is the lack of biologically relevant data on the value of wetlands, 
especially so-called “isolated” wetlands of small size. . . . We argue that small 
wetlands are extremely valuable for maintaining biodiversity in a number of plant, 
invertebrate, and vertebrate taxa (e.g., amphibians) and that the disappearance of 
small wetlands will cause a dire reduction in the ecological connectance among 
remaining species populations. 
Raymond D. Semlitsch & J. Russell Bodie, Are Small, Isolated Wetlands Expendable?, 12 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1129, 1130 (1998). 
 2. 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001). 
 3. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726 (2006). 
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States, turned on the difficult jurisdictional question of what exactly 
constitutes a “significant nexus.” The Court in those cases found 
Congress did not intend the CWA to extend federal jurisdiction to 
isolated wetlands without the requisite ties to navigable waters. 
Importantly, however, the Court not only provided its administrative 
law analysis of the scope of the CWA, it also opined that if Congress 
had intended to regulate isolated wetlands through the CWA (or 
presumably some other federal statute) it would raise “constitutional 
questions” about Congress’ authority to do so.4 
In today’s political climate it may be hard to imagine legislation 
like the CWA being passed by Congress, much less a statute aimed at 
protecting isolated wetlands. The current political climate, however, 
does not diminish the importance of isolated wetlands to our nation, 
and there are strong arguments that wetland protections may be 
warranted at the federal level if states remain reticent to protect 
them. Many states appear to eschew such protection for many of the 
same reasons the Supreme Court called federal regulation of isolated 
wetlands into doubt. Isolated wetlands are more closely associated 
with land use regulation, a traditional purview of state and local 
governments, and states are passive in protecting natural capital 
through land use regulation for fear that doing so will push 
economic growth and development to other jurisdictions—the 
typical race-to-the-bottom, commons-herder mentality played out 
on the governmental scale.5 This is not to say there are no examples 
of state-level natural capital protection policies, such as Wisconsin’s 
wetland regulatory scheme (reaching isolated wetlands);6 Portland, 
Oregon’s growth boundary program;7 Maryland’s forest 
preservation ordinance;8 or Tallahassee, Florida’s tree protection 
 
 4. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. 
 5. See BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF 
FEDERAL GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (2014). 
 6. Wetland Rules and Regulations, WISCONSIN WETLANDS ASS’N, 
http://www.wisconsinwetlands.org/protectingwisconsinregs.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2014); 
see Just v. Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). 
 7. See Urban Growth Boundary, OREGON METRO, 
http://www.oregonmetro.gov/urban-growth-boundary (last visited Sept. 20, 2014). 
 8. Washington County, Md., Forest Conservation Ordinance (Dec. 17, 2013), 
available at http://www.washco-md.net/county_attorney/pdf/forestcn.pdf. 
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ordinance.9 But these examples are few and far between, and urban 
sprawl proceeds apace across much of the nation. In addition, while 
a number of states purport to regulate isolated wetlands not 
protected at the federal level, only a handful of these programs have 
been successful to date.10 Most state and local governments rely 
solely on the CWA for protection of wetlands within their borders, 
which, of course, does not cover isolated wetlands.11 States with 
some of the highest percentages of isolated wetland acreages afford 
them no protection whatsoever.12 As a result of the SWANCC and 
Rapanos cases’ jurisdictional limitation on wetlands covered under 
the CWA, and the constitutional doubts raised by those cases, 
scholars have called for greater state and local regulation to protect 
isolated wetlands.13 These proposed policies may include special 
protection ordinances and zoning regulations, which are considered 
“the most effective protection method.”14 
Nonetheless, many isolated wetlands are left in a precarious 
position of being protected by nothing more than common law 
claims that are exceedingly difficult to prevail upon, and which are of 
limited usefulness if property owners are not actively policing 
neighbors’ attempts to drain isolated wetlands or capably playing an 
enforcement role through the court system. One wetland potentially 
falling within current conceptions of “isolated wetlands” is Ebenezer 
 
 9. Leon County, Fla., Land Development Code ch. 10, sec. 10-1.101, available at 
https://www.municode.com/library/fl/leon_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=C
OLA_CH10LADECO_ARTIINGE_S10-1.101DE. 
 10. NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, WETLANDS AT RISK: 
IMPERILED TREASURES 7 (2002), available at 
http://www.nrdc.org/water/conservation/atrisk/wetlands.pdf [hereinafter NWF & NRDC]; 
Karen Cappiella & Lisa Fraley-McNeal, The Importance of Protecting Vulnerable Streams and 
Wetlands at the Local Level, WETLANDS & WATERSHEDS 1, 19–20 (Aug. 2007); John R. 
Dorney et al., Isolated Wetlands in the Southeastern United States: A Comparison of State 
Regulatory Programs and Implications of Recent Research, 34 NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER 
21, 21–25 (2012); Scott G. Leibowitz & Tracie-Lynn Nadeau, Isolated Wetlands: State-of-the-
Science and Future Directions, 23 WETLANDS 663, 680 (2003). 
 11. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 12. Some local governments maintain 
policies aimed at isolated wetlands. Id. at 24–28. 
 12. Jon Kusler, The SWANCC Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands, ASS’N OF 
STATE WETLAND MANAGERS (2001), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/ASWM_Report.pdf. 
 13. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 1, 22. 
 14. Id. at 22, 24–28. 
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Swamp, officially known as Ebenezer Wetlands Ecological Preserve 
(Ebenezer Preserve or the Preserve). The Preserve is located just 
outside the city of Montevallo, Alabama, and is owned by the 
University of Montevallo (University). This species-rich ecosystem is 
aquifer- and rain-fed, rather than being continuously fed by surface 
streams or other “navigable waters.” When a nearby quarry operator 
made plans to open a quarry just north of the Preserve, the 
University took action, with the assistance of one of the authors 
(Hardig), relying on a common law claim of anticipatory nuisance—
an exceedingly difficult claim to prove. As demonstrated below, the 
University had to prove the quarry’s activities would, with near 
certainty, rise to a nuisance if not enjoined. While the University 
succeeded in this case, it did so primarily because the narrow set of 
facts were in its favor. 
It remains to be seen whether the Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) 
recent proposed rule delineating more clearly which wetlands meet 
the Court’s “significant nexus test”15 would result in CWA 
jurisdiction over a wetland like Ebenezer Preserve, given that a non-
navigable, perennial stream flows from the Preserve and eventually 
makes its way to traditional navigable waters. Yet at the time of the 
case in 2005, the University believed that it maintained no legitimate 
federal CWA section 404 permit claim. This doubt combined with 
the unique facts presented in the case is at least enough to support a 
conclusion that anticipatory nuisance doctrine and other archaic 
tools for environmental protection are not sufficient to reliably 
protect critical wetlands like Ebenezer Swamp. State or local 
government regulatory intervention may be preferable to federal 
intervention, as local and state governments maintain better 
information regarding the nature of isolated wetlands within their 
borders and the threats facing them, and may more efficiently 
administer programs to protect wetlands. Indeed, these are some of 
the well-recognized justifications for decentralized governance.16 But 
 
 15. Proposed Rule for Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean 
Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 22, 188 (proposed Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
110), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-04-21/pdf/2014-07142.pdf 
[hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
 16. Federalism is said to promote economic growth and reciprocity in the enforcement 
of the law, provide safeguards against the potential tyranny of centralized power, encourage 
local citizen participation in governance and experimentation with new forms of governance, 
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in the absence of holistic state or local protection across the nation, 
isolated wetlands need stronger protections. As the National Wildlife 
Federation (NWF) and National Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) argue: 
A patchwork of local and state protections cannot ensure the future 
survival of wetland-dependent migratory birds that fly thousands of 
miles, crossing entire continents. The damage caused by wetland 
destruction—increased water pollution and flooding and decreased 
groundwater recharge—is not restricted to one state. Local 
communities, states and the U.S. Congress must act quickly to 
ensure the future of the nation’s imperiled wetland treasures, or 
they will be lost forever. The inevitable result will be increased 
flooding, more water pollution and greater loss of wildlife habitat 
and biodiversity. We will all be the poorer for it.17 
Forgetting for a moment the political improbability of Congress 
passing isolated wetland regulation, does the United States need 
federal isolated wetland regulation? We argue that, in the absence of 
sufficient state or local regulatory protections, it does. Beyond that, 
is there a case to be made for the constitutionality of federal isolated 
wetlands regulation—arguments that would adequately answer the 
constitutional questions raised by the Court in SWANCC and 
Rapanos? We contend there are such arguments, and this Article lays 
the legal foundation for federal isolated wetlands legislation. Part I 
discusses the value of isolated wetland resources more generally. Part 
II briefly details the constitutional questions raised regarding 
Congress’ reach over isolated wetlands. Part III utilizes Ebenezer 
Swamp as a case study for exploring the need for isolated wetland 
regulation at the federal level in the absence of appropriate state 
action. Part IV proceeds by detailing the constitutional analysis that 
would validate federal action under the Commerce Clause, primarily 
relying on prior research applying commons analysis to the 
“substantial effects” test utilized by the Court for assessing the 
constitutionality of federal statutes under the Commerce Clause. 
 
and lead to administrative efficiency as decentralized governments can specifically tailor laws to 
fit local needs. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1994); see also Marcus B. Lane, Decentralization or 
Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest Conflict and Bioregional Assessment in 
Australia, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 283, 284–85 (2003). 
 17. NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 19. 
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Part V briefly concludes. 
I. ISOLATED WETLAND RESOURCES 
A. Wetland Values and Losses 
Wetlands provide a number of important ecosystem services.18 
Wetlands reduce damages associated with flooding, protecting 
property owners, industries and other developments, and ecosystems 
downstream. A watershed containing at least 30% wetlands, for 
example, can reduce flooding by 60% to 80% relative to watersheds 
containing no wetlands.19 Wetlands also facilitate groundwater 
recharge and discharge, acting as sponges slowly absorbing and 
releasing water from and into the soil. Through the same processes, 
wetlands perform important erosion control services. Wetlands 
perform water quality control services, filtering out nutrients like 
nitrogen, phosphorus, and organic pollutants.20 This can reduce the 
costs of developing human-built structures in the form of municipal 
water treatment systems. Wetlands further provide recreational 
opportunities21 and crucial habitats for a diverse number of 
economic and non-economic species.22 Finally, wetlands store vast 
quantities of carbon and can “contribute to amelioration of climate 
change impacts.”23 
Over the last century, development has claimed over half of all 
wetlands in North America.24 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio 
have each lost 70% or more of their original wetland acreage.25 Iowa 
 
 18. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 9–11. 
 19. Raissa Marks, Ecologically Isolated Wetlands, WILDLIFE HABITAT COUNCIL 1, 2 
(2006), available at 
http://directives.sc.egov.usda.gov/OpenNonWebContent.aspx?content=18517.wba. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at iii; Marks, supra note 19, at 2. 
 23. Loren M. Smith et al., Are Isolated Wetlands Isolated?, 33 NAT’L WETLANDS 
NEWSLETTER 26, 27 (2011) (citing Ned. H. Euliss Jr. et al., North American Prairie 
Wetlands Are Important Non-Forested Land-Based Carbon Storage Sites, 361 SCI. TOTAL 
ENV’T 179–88 (2006)). 
 24. David Moreno-Mateos et al., Structural and Functional Loss in Restored Wetland 
Ecosystems, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY 1, 1 (2012). 
 25. Marks, supra note 19, at 2. 
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has lost 95% of its wetlands, Minnesota 53%, South Dakota 35%, and 
North Dakota 60%.26 These wetland losses have created dramatic 
habitat fragmentation, isolating many wetlands from surrounding 
waters, which negatively impacts the services they are able to 
provide—and especially the preservation of biodiversity habitats. 
B. Importance of Isolated Wetlands 
The term “isolated wetlands” has not been used consistently in 
the literature and does not have a uniform definition,27 but wetlands 
considered isolated have been variously described hydrologically, 
ecologically, geographically,28 and, of course, legally.29 Ecologists 
have long defined isolated wetlands by hydrologic characteristics, 
based upon their lack of connection to other waters via surface 
waters.30 But advances in hydrologic understandings render this 
understanding ill-informed since isolated wetlands may be connected 
to other bodies of water through groundwater systems.31 Wetlands 
also can be connected to other waters biotically when spillage during 
periodic flooding transfers biological organisms between isolated 
wetlands and other waters or when those organisms are dispersed 
through the air or over land.32 All of these connections effectively 
render the descriptor “isolated” a misnomer. Rather, these wetlands 
“are best understood as occurring within an isolation-connectivity 
continuum that has both hydrologic and biotic expressions.”33 
Despite the difficulty in forming a uniform understanding of 
isolated wetlands, they have been defined in the literature as 
“geographically isolated wetlands,”34 “wetlands that are completely 
 
 26. NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 10. 
 27. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 6. 
 28. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 664 (citing Ralph Tiner, Geographically 
Isolated Wetlands of the United States, 23 WETLANDS 494 (2003)). 
 29. Smith et al., supra note 23, at 26. 
 30. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 664. 
 31. Id. (citing Dennis F. Whigham & Thomas E. Jordan, Isolated Wetlands and Water 
Quality, 23 WETLANDS 541 (2003)); see also Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 2. 
 32. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 668. 
 33. Id. at 669 (citing Scott G. Leibowitz, Isolated Wetlands and Their Functions: An 
Ecological Perspective, 23 WETLANDS 517 (2003)). 
 34. Dorney et al., supra note 10, at 21 (citing Ralph Tiner, Estimated Extent of 
Geographically Isolated Wetlands in Selected Areas of the United States, 23 WETLANDS 636–
52 (2003)). 
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surrounded by upland,”35 wetlands “not connected to each other 
or to other bodies of water by vegetated corridors or buffers, 
through which wildlife can easily disperse,”36 and wetlands 
“generally not immediately adjacent or lack[ing] apparent surface 
water connection to navigable waters; they have well-defined 
wetland boundaries surrounded by terrestrial systems.”37 The 
Corps has never formally defined isolated wetlands in the context of 
CWA jurisdiction, but has provided a definition of isolated wetlands 
in general permits issued under the program: “those non-tidal 
waters of the United States that are (1) Not part of a surface 
tributary system to interstate or navigable waters of the United 
States; and (2) Not adjacent to such tributary waterbodies.”38 The 
Corps has also issued guidance describing isolated wetlands as those 
“lack[ing] links to interstate commerce sufficient to serve as a basis 
for jurisdiction.”39 Similarly, some states have attempted to define 
isolated wetlands, such as the state of Florida describing them as 
“any wetland without a direct hydrologic connection by standing 
or flowing surface water at seasonal high water levels to a lake, 
stream, estuary, or marine waters.”40 
The exact extent of isolated wetlands nationwide is not known, 
but a number of estimates have been generated for specific states, 
as well as for the United States as a whole. The estimates typically 
have been calculated based upon the wetlands’ likelihood of being 
outside the ambit of currently understood CWA section 404 
jurisdiction, as scientists were increasingly concerned post-
SWANCC about the loss of federal jurisdiction over a number of 
wetlands considered isolated.41 As a few examples, up to 44% of 
 
 35. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 664 (quoting Tiner, supra note 28). 
 36. Marks, supra note 19, at 2. 
 37. Smith et al., supra note 23, at 26 (citing Tiner, supra note 28). 
 38. 33 C.F.R. § 330.2(e) (2014). 
 39. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATION FORM: 
INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDEBOOK 32 (2007), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/
civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/jd_guidebook_051207final.pdf; see also Dorney et al., supra 
note 10, at 21. 
 40. Robin Hart & James R. Newman, The Importance of Isolated Wetlands to Fish and 
Wildlife in Florida, in FLORIDA GAME & FRESHWATER FISH COMM’N 15 (Dec. 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
 41. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 675–76. 
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Alabama’s wetlands may fall into the isolated category,42 as may 
31% of Indiana’s, 24% of Wisconsin’s, 60% of Illinois’,43 and 40% of 
Ohio’s wetlands.44 Estimates of the total isolated wetlands area in 
the United States range from 20%45 to 30%.46 This amount is 
important, because as scholars note, “20 to 30 percent of America’s 
wetlands might eventually be deemed ‘isolated’ by the executive 
branch or by the courts because they will apply an unscientific 
standard: the absence of a direct surface connection to other bodies 
of water.”47 
Isolated wetlands provide a broad range of functional services, 
partly due to the fact that they occur over such a wide range of 
geologic and climatic settings and are of such a size and scope 
that they maintain a wide range of unique characteristics.48 
Though isolated wetlands tend to be small, some are larger in 
size.49 They include:  
woodland vernal pools, natural and excavated ponds, former 
floodplain wetlands, seepage slope wetlands, . . . prairie potholes, 
playa lakes, Delmarva bays, vernal pools, alpine wet meadows, 
Carolina bays, limesink ponds, cypress ponds, Nebraska’s Rainwater 
Basin and Sandhills wetlands, kettle-hole bogs, dune swale 
wetlands, desert springs and seeps, deflation plain wetlands, 
[pocosins, seepage swamps (aquifer fed),] and sinkhole wetlands.50 
While the South Atlantic and Gulf Coastal Plain have the greatest 
diversity of isolated wetland types, the highest proportion of isolated 
wetlands are found in the upper Great Lakes, north-central interior, 
and the Great Plains regions.51 Alabama actually maintains the 
 
 42. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 8; see also Patrick Comer et al., 
Biodiversity Values of Geographically Isolated Wetlands in the United States, NATURESERVE 
(2005), available at 
http://www.natureserve.org/sites/default/files/projects/files/isolated_wetlands.pdf 
(estimating Alabama isolated wetlands represent 36% of the state’s total wetlands). 
 43. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 666. 
 44. NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 9. 
 45. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 666. 
 46. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 7. 
 47. NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 2. 
 48. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 663. 
 49. Id. at 665. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Comer et al., supra note 42; see also NATI’L WILDLIFE FED,N & NATURAL RES. 
 
07 HUDSON.PAGINATED 1443-1488 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2015  9:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1454 
greatest proportion of isolated wetlands of any state in the 
southeastern United States, with up to 44% of the state’s total 
wetland area isolated, as noted earlier.52 
Isolated wetlands, though “isolated” by some amorphous 
standard, “do not operate in a vacuum, and they provide ecosystem 
services to the whole of society far beyond the boundaries of the 
individual wetland.”53 They facilitate groundwater recharge of 
important aquifers such as the Ogallala,54 upon which much of the 
United States’ agricultural and energy development depends.55 Not 
only do isolated wetlands play this important water supply role, but 
they also detain local surface and precipitation runoff.56 Isolated 
wetlands transfer nutrients to nearby lands and waters, moderate 
temperature of receiving waters to which they maintain connections, 
and physically retain, absorb, or chemically transform sediments or 
other nutrients.57 Conversely, the loss or draining of isolated 
wetlands can lead to degradation of other waters downslope 
(including those considered navigable waters under the CWA).58 
Accordingly, isolated wetlands play a key role in regional water 
quality and availability. 
Isolated wetlands support high levels of biodiversity, and “are 
among the country’s most significant resources in terms of 
biological diversity.”59 They often support rare, threatened, and 
endangered species, “partly because they represent an infrequent 
habitat type within a relatively homogeneous landscape.”60 One-
third of species threatened or endangered in the United States 
depend on wetlands generally, and many of those are found solely 
 
DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 4. 
 52. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 8. Others estimate that isolated 
wetlands in the Southeast generally make up no more than 5% of total wetland acreage, though 
it is difficult to determine with certainty given different conceptions of what is “isolated.” 
Dorney et al., supra note 10, at 23; see also Comer et al., supra note 42. 
 53. Smith et al., supra note 23, at 27. 
 54. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 669. 
 55. Id.; Smith et al., supra note 23, at 26. 
 56. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 670. 
 57. Id.; Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 10. 
 58. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 670. 
 59. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 11. 
 60. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 671. 
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in isolated wetland habitats.61 A 2005 study of all fifty states 
found isolated wetlands supported 274 at-risk plant and animal 
species, many of which were endemic to isolated wetland 
habitats.62 One study determined that twenty species of 
amphibians in South Carolina “would become extinct if all . . . 
isolated wetlands were lost.”63 
Because some isolated wetlands experience wet-dry cycles, they 
also can have high temporal diversity64 as the habitat shifts back and 
forth over time during respective cycles and provides a degree of 
dynamism to the habitat not seen in contiguous wetlands.65 In 
particular, the southeastern United States maintains a wide range of 
isolated wetlands noted for their biological uniqueness and for 
supporting species not found in “navigable” wetlands, as that term is 
understood jurisdictionally.66 Even so, habitat loss for important 
species relying on isolated wetlands has been particularly severe in 
the southeastern United States.67 Studies performed in areas rich in 
biodiversity, like Florida, have concluded that due to isolated 
wetlands’ support of a wide range of diverse species, isolated 
wetlands “should receive the same degree of protection as 
contiguous wetlands,”68 and that “[t]he legal emphasis on protection 
of contiguous wetlands can be traced to limited understanding of the 
biological importance of isolated wetlands.”69 
Isolated wetlands are threatened by agriculture, forestry and 
mining activities, and general land development for commercial, 
residential, and other purposes.70 Over the last few decades, for 
example, a disturbing correlation has emerged between the rate of 
population growth and the rate of land development. As seen in 
Figure 1, even as population grows, land is developed at more than 
 
 61. Marks, supra note 19, at 4. 
 62. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 11. 
 63. Id. (citing SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, AT RISK: SOUTH 
CAROLINA’S “ISOLATED” WETLANDS 2003–2004 (2004)). 
 64. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 10, at 671. 
 65. Hart & Newman, supra note 40, at 105. 
 66. Id. at 3. 
 67. Semlitsch & Bodie, supra note 1, at 1132. 
 68. Hart & Newman, supra note 40, at ii. 
 69. Id. at 2. 
 70. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 11. 
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twice the rate of population growth.71 This has dire implications for 
the future of the nation’s wetlands as populations continue to rise. 
Indeed, between 1998 and 2004, nearly 61% of wetland losses were 
due to urban and rural land development.72 
 
 
 71. DANA BEACH, COASTAL SPRAWL: THE EFFECTS OF URBAN DESIGN ON AQUATIC 
ECOSYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, PEW OCEANS COMM’N 4–5 (2002), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/prote
cting_ocean_life/envpewoceanssprawlpdf.pdf. 
 72. T. E. DAHL, STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED 
STATES 1998 TO 2004, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. 16 (2006), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/Documents/Status-and-Trends-of-Wetlands-in-the-
Conterminous-United-States-1998-to-2004.pdf. 
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 Figure 1  Ratio of Acres of Land Developed to Population Growth 
A number of factors make isolated wetlands particularly 
07 HUDSON.PAGINATED 1443-1488 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2015  9:44 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1458 
vulnerable to development. Isolated wetlands are relatively easy to fill 
(or to justify planning for “relocation”73) compared to larger 
contiguous wetlands. In addition, they are “often unnamed, rarely 
appear on maps, and are not always wet,” which means “they are not 
always recognized as streams or wetlands and are consequently not 
afforded adequate protection during development.”74 The 
aggregated effects of isolated wetland loss are significant. As one 
scholar notes, “[o]ne must also consider cumulative loss: a single 
1/4 acre wetland may not seem to be a significant loss, but a 
thousand is quite a different story” since the aggregate loss increases 
flooding and decreases water quality, groundwater recharge, and 
wildlife habitat through fragmentation.75 
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ISOLATED WETLANDS 
A. Wetlands and the Clean Water Act 
Most federal environmental laws are passed pursuant to the 
authority of Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.”76 The CWA is one such law. It regulates “navigable 
waters,” defined as “waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”77 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Corps, who administer the statute, have subsequently defined 
“waters of the United States” to include a wide variety of wetlands, 
including wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters and 
wetlands along tributaries flowing to traditional navigable waters. 
The Corps recently issued a proposed rule clarifying its jurisdiction.78 
 
 73. Furthermore, ecologists have long understood relocation and mitigation of wetlands 
to be problematic, due to the difficulties in achieving functionality of original wetlands among 
other problems. See Joy B. Zedler, Ecological Issues in Wetland Mitigation: An Introduction to 
the Forum, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 33 (1996); Moreno-Mateos et al., supra note 24; 
Jeremy Hance, Protecting Original Wetlands Far Preferable to Restoration, 
MONGABAY.COM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://news.mongabay.com/2012/0126-
hance_wetlands_restoration.html?utm_campaign=General
+news&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_source=SNS.analytics (citation omitted). 
 74. Cappiella & Fraley-McNeal, supra note 10, at 18. 
 75. Plocher et al., supra note 1, at 3. 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 77. 33 U.S.C § 1362 (2012). 
 78. Proposed Rule, supra note 15; see also Clean Water Act Definition of “Waters of the 
U.S.”, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/CWAwaters.cfm (last visited 
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The CWA requires a permit for discharging “dredged or fill 
materials” into jurisdictional wetlands79 under its Section 404 
program. The Corps is given the primary responsibility of issuing 
404 permits for the fill of wetlands while the EPA undertakes an 
oversight role.80 The “no net loss” policy adopted under the first 
Bush administration requires that 404 permitting be tied to 
mitigation activities to reduce the loss of wetland area.81 Before a 
permit is issued, parties must demonstrate they have attempted to 
avoid damage to wetlands and, if avoidance is impossible, that they 
have minimized wetland destruction and compensated for any 
damages that may occur. Compensation can be achieved through 
mitigation activities that offset the destruction of wetlands through 
wetland protection or restoration elsewhere. These activities can 
include mitigation banking, in-lieu fee permitting, and permittee-
responsible mitigation.82 
B. SWANCC and Rapanos: Administrative Limits on the Clean 
Water Act 
The CWA’s influence over the nation’s wetland resources is not 
boundless, however, and the Supreme Court has found 
administrative limits on the CWA’s scope within the text of the 
statute itself—though those limits are quite unclear in their own 
scope. These administrative limits were highlighted in two relatively 
recent cases, SWANCC83 and Rapanos.84 Importantly, these two 
cases have also caused a great deal of concern over the scope of the 
federal government’s environmental authority under the 
Commerce Clause.85 
 
Sept. 23, 2014). 
 79. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 80. The EPA’s oversight role is very limited in practice, however. Though the EPA 
maintains veto authority over Corps permitting, it only exercised this power eleven times 
between 1972 and 2007. CRAIG PITTMAN & MATTHEW WAITE, PAVING PARADISE: FLORIDA’S 
VANISHING WETLANDS AND THE FAILURE OF NO NET LOSS 167 (2009). 
 81. United States Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, 
Wetlands, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/water/wetlands/. 
 82. 33 C.F.R. 230 (2012). 
 83. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWAANC), 
531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001). 
 84. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726 (2006). 
 85. Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital 
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SWANCC involved parties who sought to purchase an 
abandoned gravel pit in which to dispose of nonhazardous wastes.86 
Water within the pit, however, had contributed to the emergence of 
a habitat for endangered migratory birds.87 The Corps denied the 
parties a permit for the proposed use under its Section 404(a) 
authority,88 applying what it referred to as the Migratory Bird Rule. 
The rule asserted that the Corps’s jurisdiction extended to intrastate 
waters “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by . . . migratory 
birds which cross state lines.”89 The government argued “the 
protection of migratory birds is a ‘national interest of very nearly the 
first magnitude,’ . . . [and], as the Court of Appeals found, millions 
of people spend over a billion dollars annually on recreational 
pursuits relating to migratory birds.”90 
Though plaintiffs raised a number of constitutional challenges to 
the rule, the Court proceeded to decide the case upon statutory 
interpretation grounds, avoiding constitutional questions about the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.91 The Court construed the CWA as 
not granting the Corps the authority to reach isolated wetlands like 
the abandoned mining pit and held the CWA did not apply to 
intrastate land merely because of the presence of migratory birds.92 
The Court again addressed the scope of the CWA’s application 
to wetlands in Rapanos.93 In Rapanos, a number of property owners 
challenged the Corps’s 404 permitting authority over portions of 
property connected to wetlands by man-made drains. The Court 
rejected the Corps’s claim that the CWA gave it the power to 
regulate wetlands notwithstanding tenuous connections to 
“navigable waters.”94 The Court, as in SWANCC, based its 
conclusion solely upon statutory interpretation grounds, construing 
 
Regulation Under the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 416–18 (2011). 
 86. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163. 
 87. Id. at 164. 
 88. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012); SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165. 
 89. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328.3). 
 90. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173. 
 91. Id. at 174. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 94. Id. at 730–32. 
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the CWA narrowly and refusing to address the constitutional issues 
raised by the property owners.95 The decision, however, was a 
plurality decision, with four Justices maintaining a narrow 
jurisdictional view of wetlands with strong surface connections to 
waters that are navigable in fact, four Justices deferring to the 
Corps’s determination of wetland jurisdiction, and Justice Kennedy 
declaring that wetlands with a “significant nexus” to navigable waters 
were covered under the CWA.96 
C. Constitutional Limits on Future Federal Isolated Wetland 
Legislation?: “Significant Constitutional and Federalism Questions” 
Though the Court refused to address the constitutional claims 
raised by plaintiffs in SWANCC,97 it still opined on how those claims 
might manifest were they before the Court. For example, the 
Court stated: 
These are significant constitutional questions raised by 
respondents’ application of their regulations . . . . Permitting 
respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats 
falling within the “Migratory Bird Rule” would result in a 
significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary 
power over land and water use. . . . We thus read the statute as 
written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism 
questions raised by respondents’ interpretation . . . .98 
Similarly, in Rapanos the Court stated it would not read the 
CWA so expansively as to allow the act to extend to an area 
traditionally reserved for state governments, arguing: 
Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the development 
permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a 
quintessential state and local power. . . . The extensive federal 
 
 95. Id. at 739. See Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules 
After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 127. Somin argues that “Rapanos 
probably does not impose significant limits on the scope of federal authority under the 
CWA.” Id. at 130. 
 96. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 717, 726, 788. 
 97. Plaintiffs claimed that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause 
to grant jurisdiction over wetlands subject to the Migratory Bird Rule. SWANCC, 531 
U.S. at 166. 
 98. Id. at 174. 
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jurisdiction urged by the Government would authorize the Corps 
to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of intrastate 
land—an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise 
with the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board. 
. . . [T]he Corps’ interpretation stretches the outer limits of 
Congress’s commerce power and raises difficult questions about 
the ultimate scope of that power.99 
To be clear, the Court did not state that such an intrusion would 
be per se unconstitutional, but rather it stated the Court would need 
a clear statement from Congress claiming such authority before it 
could engage in constitutional analysis.100 While the Court did not 
decide the constitutional questions it raised, the casting of doubt on 
federal authority over isolated wetlands has implications for the 
ultimate protection of many wetlands important to the nation—
including wetlands with ecological and economic importance like 
Ebenezer Preserve. The next section demonstrates the value of 
wetlands like Ebenezer Preserve, and the archaic, unreliable 
protections afforded to them in the absence of local and state 
protections and in the event that they may fall outside the ambit of 
federal jurisdiction under the CWA. The following section lays the 
foundation for Part IV’s discussion of how, in the absence of local or 
state protections, federal protections should, and could, 
constitutionally be implemented for isolated wetlands. 
III. A NEED FOR FEDERAL ISOLATED WETLAND LEGISLATION?: 
EBENEZER PRESERVE CASE STUDY 
A. A Wetland of National Importance: Ecological Overview 
1. Regional geology and hydrology 
Ebenezer Swamp is located on Spring Creek at the southern end 
of the Cahaba Valley in western Shelby County, Alabama. This 
region of the Cahaba Valley is located within the Appalachian fold 
and thrust belt and is situated on top of a series of carbonate rocks of 
Cambrian and Ordovician age.101 Large-scale folding and faulting of 
 
 99. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738 (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 738. 
 101. WILLIAM M. WARREN, SINKHOLE OCCURRENCE IN WESTERN SHELBY COUNTY, 
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these sedimentary bedrocks has resulted in complex geologic 
structure and groundwater flow patterns. Groundwater moving 
through the carbonate bedrock beneath the Cahaba Valley forms a 
part of the Valley and Ridge Aquifer system.102 Generally, the 
geologic and hydrologic conditions in a youthful carbonate valley 
such as the Cahaba Valley are such that groundwater moves from 
higher to lower elevations, returning to the surface as springs where 
the water table intersects the land surface. As seen in Figure 2, 
ground water also reappears as stream flow in stream channels, 
coinciding with the lowest point in the valley cross section.103 The 
carbonaceous bedrocks beneath southern Cahaba Valley form a karst 
terrain, where sinkholes occur.104 Several municipal water systems 
(e.g., the cities of Montevallo, Calera, and Wilton) and numerous 
private water consumers in the region use wells and pumps to draw 
water from these aquifer systems for a variety of domestic and 
commercial uses. The waters of the Valley and Ridge Aquifer system 
issue from countless springs throughout the region and many of 
these springs are found in association with wetland habitats.105 
 
 
ALABAMA, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF ALABAMA (1976). 
 102. Lois D. George et al., The Hydrogeology of Ebenezer Swamp and Vicinity—
Preservation of a Ground-Water Dependent Ecosystem, in SINKHOLES AND THE ENGINEERING 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF KARST 414–22 (L.B. Yuhr, C.A. Alexander & B.F. Beck 
eds., 2008); WARREN, supra note 101. 
 103. See infra Figure 2. 
 104. See George et al., supra note 102; WARREN, supra note 101. 
 105. WARREN, supra note 101. 
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Figure 2  Schematic cross-section of basin showing geologic and  
hydrologic conditions in a youthful carbonate valley. 
 
 
2. Ebenezer Preserve hydrology 
Ebenezer Preserve sits on a pivotal point in the local watershed 
and its ecology is determined in large part by the hydrology of the 
site (that is, its water cycle).106 North of Ebenezer Swamp, the upper 
portion of Spring Creek is fed by annual streams. Annual streams 
carry water intermittently, usually during and after rainfall events, 
and are dry the rest of the time. Despite the episodic additions of 
surface water from the north, Ebenezer Swamp is perpetually wet 
and Spring Creek issues from it as a perennial stream. The disparity 
between the northern and southern ends is due to the contribution 
of groundwater from numerous artesian (i.e., free-flowing) springs 
along the creek within the boundaries of the Preserve. This is typical 
of all streams located on top of Valley and Ridge carbonate 
terrains.107 Ebenezer Swamp is underlain by Ketona and Bibb 
 
 106. George et al., supra note 102. 
 107. See supra Figure 2. 
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dolomite of the Cambrian Age, which forms the matrix for a portion 
of the Valley and Ridge Aquifer system, the source of Ebenezer 
Swamp’s groundwater inputs. 
Surface water and groundwater move into and through the site 
at very different speeds. Surface water moves quickly in open flow 
above the soil surface when the subsurface is saturated, while 
groundwater moves through cavities and pores in the soil and 
bedrock forming the aquifer.108 The amount of surface water flowing 
at any given time fluctuates from nothing during dry periods to 
“peak flow” after a rainfall. Groundwater-fed spring flows, however, 
are continuous and persistent, drawing on the reservoir-capacity of 
the aquifer. Within the boundaries of Ebenezer Swamp, the stream 
surface of Spring Creek is also the surface of the water table.109 
Likewise, the points at which the many artesian wells issue water 
along the western margin of Spring Creek also mark the surface of 
the water table.110 One such spring is Ebenezer Spring, which is 
adjacent to the Ebenezer United Methodist Church, affording 
public access to the spring. The springhead is encircled by a low-
walled cistern of indeterminate age. Watercress thrives in the cool 
clear water issuing from the cistern on its way into the Preserve. 
Locals have visited Ebenezer Spring for both water and 
watercress for a century or more (Ebenezer United Methodist 
Church was established in 1818, along the western margin of what 
would later become known as Ebenezer Swamp) and long-term 
residents have never known Ebenezer Spring to go dry. The 
combination of groundwater inputs from numerous springs like 
Ebenezer Spring and surface water input after rainfall events is what 
keeps Spring Creek flowing, even during dry seasons, and permits 
the establishment of mature upland hardwood swamp wetlands, such 
as Ebenezer Preserve. 
3. Ebenezer Preserve ecology 
Ebenezer Swamp formed over the last 10,000 years at a point of 
confluence between ephemeral surface water runoff from the 
surrounding watershed (a drainage area of approximately 6.2 square 
 
 108. WARREN, supra note 101. 
 109. See supra Figure 2. 
 110. Id. 
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miles, or 4200 acres, in extent) and perennial groundwater issuing 
from the underlying Valley and Ridge Aquifer system. The most 
recent ice episode of the Quaternary Period, known as the 
Wisconsinan Continental Glaciation, peaked in the late Pleistocene 
(circa 18,000 years Before Present (B.P.)), and major vegetation 
patterns present at that time persisted until approximately 10,000 
years B.P., when climatic warming and ice sheet retreat resulted in 
widespread changes in the vegetation.111 By the beginning of the 
Holocene Period (10,000 years B.P.), the climatic regimes of the 
southeastern United States were much as they are today.112 Major 
modern forest types were flourishing, but “the understory flora had 
not yet come to resemble modern herbaceous floras.”113 During the 
subsequent Hypsithermal Period (circa 8700–5000 years B.P.), 
significant warming and drying of the climate reduced the ranges of 
mesic plant species (i.e., those adapted to environments having a 
balanced supply of moisture) to shrinking riparian and riverine 
areas.114 By the end of the Hypsithermal Period (circa 5000 years 
B.P.), all of the vegetative elements of the modern southern riparian 
and riverine habitats were in place.115 
Today, Ebenezer Preserve consists of approximately 120 acres of 
wooded wetlands and is home to numerous species of fungi, plants, 
and animals, nine of which are considered imperiled, threatened, or 
endangered.116 Ebenezer Preserve is an upland hardwood seepage 
swamp, as it occurs above the Gulf Coast coastal plain and fall line, 
marking the southern limits of the Cumberland and Piedmont 
plateaus and the Appalachian Mountains. The Preserve is forested 
primarily with hardwood trees and receives its principal water inputs 
from springs. The forest is dominated by tupelo gum (Nyssa 
aquatica), with occasional red maple (Acer rubrum), loblolly pine 
 
 111. Paul A. Delcourt & Hazel R. Delcourt, Paleoclimates, Paleovegetation, and 
Paleofloras during the late Quaternary, in FLORA OF NORTH AMERICA 71, 71–96 (Nancy R. 
Morin et al. eds., 1993). 
 112. Wayne Owen, The History of Native Plant Communities in the South, in SOUTHERN 
FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT 47, 49 (David N. Wear & John G. Greis eds., 2002). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Amended Complaint at 19, Univ. of Montevallo Found. v. Middle Tenn. Land Dev. 
Co., No. CV-05-624 (Ala. 30th Dist. Ct. 2005). 
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(Pinus taeda), sweet bay (Magnolia virginiana), tulip tree 
(Liriodendron tulipifera), and sycamore (Platanus occidentalis). The 
dominant animal life form is the beaver (Castor canadensis); water 
impounded behind several beaver dams along Spring Creek has a 
pronounced effect on the ecology of the Preserve. Other animal 
inhabitants include the American woodcock (Philohela minor), 
turkey (Meleagris gallopavo), great blue heron (Ardea herodia), 
pileated woodpecker (Dryocopus pileatus), water moccasin 
(Agkistrodon piscivorus), copperhead (Agkistrodon contortrix), 
raccoon (Procyon lotor), opossum (Didelphis marsupialis virginiana), 
and numerous species of freshwater invertebrates. Ebenezer Preserve 
is also home to many herbaceous plant species, including six species 
of orchids (Ponthieva racemosa, Platanthera flava, P. clavellata, 
Listera australis, Spiranthes ovalis, and Tipularia discolor), a critically 
imperiled species of cone-flower (Rudbeckia auriculata), and the 
endangered Tennessee yellow-eyed grass (Xyris tennesseensis). 
Spring Creek and Ebenezer Swamp form a portion of the headwaters 
for the ecologically diverse and environmentally sensitive Cahaba 
River Watershed. The Cahaba is the longest remaining free-flowing 
river in Alabama, has more species of fish per mile than any river in 
North America, and is one of eight river biodiversity hotspots in the 
United States.117 
4. Ebenezer Preserve utilization 
Ebenezer Preserve has a long history of public utilization. The 
previous private owners of the property generously permitted local 
scouting groups to camp and explore the habitat, hosted local 
birding clubs for annual counts, and granted free access to local 
educational institutions, such as the University of Montevallo, 
Samford University, and Birmingham Southern University, for field 
trips and research activities. In 1998, the University gained title to 
much of the property within the boundary of the swamp via a grant 
stating the property should be “held in perpetuity by the Grantee 
and used by the Grantee and the University of Montevallo in 
connection with its academic mission and program; and . . . 
maintained in its natural state to the greatest extent reasonably 
 
 117. RIVERS OF LIFE: CRITICAL WATERSHEDS FOR PROTECTING FRESHWATER 
BIODIVERSITY 30 (Lawrence L. Master et al. eds., 1998). 
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possible.”118 The University has pursued a policy of encouraging 
public use by increasing public access. To date, the University has 
constructed approximately 1000 feet of ADA-compliant boardwalk 
through a portion of the swamp—which is outfitted with seventeen 
interpretive plaques, benches, and viewing areas—and added public 
restrooms, as well as an outdoor classroom. These projects have been 
supported, in part, through the procurement of federal 
appropriations. The Ebenezer Preserve boardwalk is accessible to all 
visitors seven days a week, from dawn until dusk, during periods of 
clement weather, without need of reservation or scheduling, for self-
guided tours. The University provides free scheduled guided tours to 
civic groups, school groups, clubs, and private groups as requested. 
Ebenezer Swamp continues to serve as a fieldtrip destination for 
local colleges and universities and has served as a resource in various 
research projects over the years for students in a variety of disciplines, 
such as art, biology, business, and mass communication. The 
Preserve has been a location for numerous biology student research 
projects, including studies of tupelo gum tree age structure, analyses 
of soils and sediments for heavy-metal contamination, analysis of 
swamp water for mutagenic chemicals, analyses of general water 
quality, and the cataloging of vascular and non-vascular plant, avian, 
insect, fish, and amphibian species. Much of this work has been 
presented at annual meetings of the National Council on 
Undergraduate Research. The University’s art department has used 
the Preserve as a field site for a course on design and creation and 
installation of public art pieces, with three such pieces now gracing 
the boardwalk trail. Students of the mass communications program 
have used the Preserve as a location for the production of 
informational and educational videos as part of their coursework. 
Additionally, the Preserve has hosted numerous visits by local 
grammar, elementary, and high school groups, home schooling co-
ops, gardening clubs, and botanical societies. The Preserve has 
hosted visits by various leadership groups including Montevallo High 
School’s Leaders of Tomorrow, Shelby County’s Youth Leadership, 
and Alabama’s Boys State programs. Other institutions of higher 
learning also make use of the Preserve as a field site, including 
Samford University and Birmingham Southern College. 
 
 118. Amended Complaint, supra note 116, at 12–13. 
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The University continues to promote and expand the educational 
and research potential of the Preserve. The University recently 
acquired the original farmhouse that sits adjacent to the Preserve 
with the intent of converting it into a visitors’ center with hands-on 
interpretive features, living collections, and audiovisual presentations. 
Future plans call for an observational tower and real-time 
meteorological and hydrological monitoring stations. 
B. Interstate Threat to Ebenezer Swamp: Land Use Development 
Wetland resources have been in decline since European settlement, 
and many of those remaining occur in disturbed landscapes. Given 
their position on the landscape and that many occur on private 
lands, it is likely that much of the isolated wetland resource will 
continue to be under development pressure.119 
In the early part of 2005, the University became aware of the 
efforts of an entity doing business as the Middle Tennessee Land 
Development Co., LLC (Middle Tennessee) to acquire the title to 
approximately 412 acres in the vicinity of Ebenezer Swamp, upon 
which it intended to develop a 239-acre quarry operation. Middle 
Tennessee’s intent was to quarry the Newala Limestone beneath this 
portion of the valley—an operation it estimated would require forty 
years and would extract $400 million worth of resources. The 
proposed quarry would have been located approximately 900 feet 
upstream from Ebenezer Swamp. Currently, there are eight active 
limestone/dolomite quarries in operation within the immediate area 
of western Shelby County and Ebenezer Swamp. An acquired 
familiarity with the effects of these local quarry operations gave the 
University good reason to be concerned about the likely adverse 
effects of the proposed quarry on Ebenezer Swamp. The University 
was informed by the work of William M. Warren on sinkhole 
occurrence in Shelby County120 and the personal observations of one 
of the authors (Hardig). 
The potential risks to the Preserve of a quarry operation in its 
immediate vicinity were already well known to one of the authors 
(Hardig) because several years previously he had been approached by 
 
 119. Leibowitz & Nadeau, supra note 12, at 682. 
 120. See WARREN, supra note 103. 
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local citizens concerned about the reopening of another local 
limestone quarry near Brierfield, Alabama. Specifically, the 
concerned individuals asked the author (a botanist) to make a survey 
of the area immediately surrounding the idle Brierfield quarry for 
possible rare and/or endangered species, the presence of which 
might be taken into consideration during the permitting process. 
The author familiarized himself with the flora, fauna, and geology 
and hydrology of the area, being greatly informed in the latter two 
areas by the work of Warren, and then compiled many hours of 
ground-level observations that did not uncover any protected species 
but did make him well acquainted with the process of quarrying and 
its effects on central Alabama ecologies and landscapes. 
The University’s principal concern was the effect the quarrying 
operation would have on the amount of groundwater available to 
sustain Ebenezer Swamp. The limestone and dolomite excavated 
from other local quarries is the same limestone and dolomite that 
forms the matrix of the Valley and Ridge Aquifer system. Without 
virtually continuous pumping, these quarries would quickly fill with 
water from the aquifer. Consequently, the quarries must be 
dewatered. One such quarry, approximately four miles southeast of 
Ebenezer Swamp, in the area of Dry Valley, is being dewatered for 
limestone quarrying operations. In 1973, the calculated dewatering 
rate in Dry Valley was 14,000 gallons per minute, causing a large 
depression in the profile of the underlying water table.121 The 
groundwater pumped out of the quarries leaves the valley as 
surface-water runoff in Dry Creek. Since 1976, all dug and drilled 
water wells in Dry Valley have been dry because the water table was 
lowered below their maximum depth (Figure 3). Sinkholes began 
developing in Dry Valley during 1964 and the rate of formation 
and affected area has been steadily increasing since. It is estimated 
that more than 1000 sinkholes and related features (subsidence, 
scour holes, and other features previously described) have occurred 
in the approximately ten square miles affected by the water-table 
decline. Additionally, once-perennial springs that historically fed 
lower Spring Creek have stopped flowing as a result of the 
dewatering operation and depressed water table.122 
 
 121. See infra Figure 3 (adapted from WARREN, supra note103). 
 122. Id. 
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In 2001, the lower portion of Spring Creek, beginning south of 
its intersection with County Road 22 and continuing to its 
confluence with Dry Creek (Figure 3), went dry during a prolonged 
period of drought, despite the fact water continued to flow from 
Ebenezer Swamp into the upper portion of Spring Creek. The most 
 
Figure 3.  Approximate potentiometric surface in Dry 
Valley, October 1973.  (Datum is mean sea level.  
Contour interval = 50 ft (15 m). 
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probable explanation for this development is that reduced surface 
flow associated with drought, combined with a lowering of the water 
table due to dewatering in the adjacent Dry Valley quarries (Figure 
3), lowered the stream surface to a point where it flowed in the 
bedrock beneath the stream bottom. Many specimens of fish 
perished when the stream “dried” up. This condition persisted until 
the first major rains of the year, a short time after which the stream 
surface rose above the stream bottom and flow returned to normal. 
This episode is symptomatic of the effects of water table alterations 
on wetlands, and demonstrates the complex hydrology affecting 
important national resources regardless of “navigability” of waters or 
the presence or absence of geopolitical boundaries. 
Significant resistance to the proposed quarry by local residents, 
two municipalities (Montevallo and Alabaster), and the University 
developed quickly. The former president of the University held a 
meeting involving the mayors of Calera, Montevallo, and Alabaster 
to discuss appropriate actions of resistance. While the mayor of 
Calera was not inclined to participate, the mayors of Montevallo and 
Alabaster were unanimous in their opposition to the proposed 
development. The mayor of Alabaster proposed raising 
administrative challenges to the Alabama Department of 
Environmental Management (ADEM) permitting process based on a 
lack of due diligence on its part, and organizing public meetings to 
inform and engage the local populace. The administrative challenges 
ultimately proved fruitless, but the public meetings were very 
effective for distributing relevant information and in promoting a 
grassroots organization coordinating letter-writing campaigns 
targeted at ADEM and state officials. The University decided to seek 
a legal injunction through the court system on the grounds that the 
quarry operation would ruin the ecological and educational value of 
Ebenezer Swamp. 
As described in greater detail below, the basis of the 
University’s lawsuit was that the groundwater connections between 
the quarry site and Ebenezer Swamp are so extensive that the 
quarry’s operation upstream and within the Preserve’s source water 
area123 would ensure degradation, and eventual destruction, of the 
 
 123.  “Source water area” refers to the upstream/upslope area from which the water 
found in and under the swamp arises. 
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Preserve. To support its argument, the University hired the services 
of P.E. LaMoreaux and Associates, Inc. (PELA) to perform a 
hydrogeologic investigation. PELA reviewed published 
information, performed site reconnaissance visits to both Ebenezer 
Swamp and the proposed quarry site, examined drilling logs from 
an earlier study of the quarry site, performed additional drilling and 
geophysical logging on the quarry site, and modeled predicted 
drawdowns on the water table that would be caused by dewatering 
at the quarry site.124 The University’s personnel spent much of the 
summer of 2005 finding and documenting the numerous (more 
than 80) springs and seeps located within the Ebenezer Swamp 
boundary. The case of University of Montevallo v. Middle Tennessee 
Land Development Co., LLC was tried in the Circuit Court of 
Shelby County, Alabama, in 2006. 
C. University of Montevallo v. Middle Tennessee Land Development 
Co., LLC 
The University claimed “devastating and irreparable impact” 
would ensue if the quarry was developed.125 The University’s 
argument was based primarily on the loss of an education and 
research resource for students at all levels of education and the 
general citizenry; loss of recruitment of prospective students; loss of 
good will within the local and regional community (which expected 
the University to exercise care of the resource); loss of investments in 
the enhancement of the Preserve; and harm to the University’s 
reputation for having failed to hold in perpetuity and maintain the 
Preserve in its natural state, as it was entrusted to do.126 The 
University’s legal claims were based, first, on unreasonable use of 
groundwater, second, on nuisance, and third, on a theory of public 
trust. All of these, of course, are state common-law claims—
University lawyers believed the Preserve was isolated enough from 
traditional navigable waters that the University would have no 
federal CWA claim for the draining of the wetland by a neighboring 
property owner. 
Addressing the claim of unreasonable use of water, the 
 
 124. George, et al., supra note 104. 
 125.  Amended Complaint, supra note 116, at 6. 
 126. Id. at 33–34. 
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University established that the Preserve and Middle Tennessee 
shared the aquifer below the respective properties. The University 
argued that the use of water by Middle Tennessee was per se 
unreasonable since the primary reason the water was being pumped 
from the aquifer was because it was a “barrier to the extraction of 
the minerals, and is thus wasted rather than being used.”127 The 
University further argued that as owner of the land it was also the 
owner of the groundwater underlying the land under Alabama 
law,128 and therefore could bring a claim for damages to it. The 
complaint alleged that the Preserve is “totally dependent upon the 
groundwater in the aquifer which underlies it. The wetlands are 
formed by the nature-provided mineral and chemical composition 
of the groundwater in the aquifer.”129 The complaint further 
argued that if the water was removed from the aquifer under the 
Preserve through pumping for mining limestone, the Preserve 
could never be restored. 
As for nuisance, the University argued that not only would the 
mining’s effects on the water table damage the Preserve, but also 
that the removal of soil and vegetation overlaying the mine would 
lead to erosion contaminating the waters of the Preserve. The 
contamination would negatively impact fish and plant species, and 
would also remove an important water purification mechanism 
leading to increased contaminants and pollutants in both the aquifer 
and the surface water. Sinkholes developing in areas not mined 
would also threaten the Preserve. Moreover, “[d]ust created by the 
quarrying operations would clog pores leading to the aquifer and 
diminish the recharge rate for the aquifer,”130 choke vegetation at the 
Preserve, leach into the soil causing further vegetation death, and 
remove food sources for the fauna there. Finally, the University 
claimed that discharged wastewater would ultimately make its way 
into the Preserve, and that blasting during the mining process would 
loosen soils, divert surface and groundwater, and interfere with 
 
 127. Id. at 26. See Martin v. City of Linden, 667 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1995); JANICE 
HOLBEN ET AL., 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 231 (“[T]here is no right to draw water from a 
common underground reservoir merely for the purpose of wasting it to the injury of other 
landowners having an equal right to and means of access thereto.”). 
 128. Amended Complaint, supra note 116, at 13. 
 129. Id. at 22. 
 130. Id. at 30. 
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biological life cycle processes. 
While a typical nuisance in Alabama is considered an action that 
“works hurt, inconvenience, or damage” to a property owner’s 
property, the injury here had not yet occurred.131 The University, 
therefore, relied upon the doctrine of “anticipatory nuisance,” which 
is described in the Alabama Code as “injunction before 
completion.”132 The code states “[w]here the consequences of a 
nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable in 
damages and such consequences are not merely possible but to a 
reasonable degree certain, a court may interfere to arrest a nuisance 
before it is completed.”133 The University claimed the quarrying 
operation would constitute both a public and private nuisance—
private because of the damages to the University’s property and 
public because the quarrying would injure a wide range of citizens, 
including present and future students. 
Finally, on the claim of public trust, the University cited cases 
from other states supporting the conclusion that wetland resources 
like Ebenezer Preserve were subject to public-trust protections.134 
The donation of the tract for preservation in perpetuity, to be 
maintained in a natural state, indicated the University was to act as a 
trustee over the Preserve, and presumably since the University was 
an organ of the state, this duty extended to the state. 
Based upon these three claims, the University sought a 
declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief against Middle Tennessee. Trial was held in August and 
September of 2006. The court issued an order in October 2006. 
The court started out by noting that the proposed mining activity 
was legal, as it was not barred by any zoning or other land use 
constraints.135 The court stated, however, that the University could 
succeed on its claims if it proved that “the quarry operation will 
 
 131. Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
 132. ALA. CODE § 6-5-125 (2005). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 578 (Mass. 1969) (prohibiting highway construction which would 
have replaced “wetlands of considerable natural beauty with a large capacity for the storage of 
water during flood seasons and [which] are often used for nature study and recreation”). 
 135. Order at 2, Univ. of Montevallo Found. v. Middle Tenn. Land Dev. Co., No. CV-
05-624 (Ala. 30th D. Cir. Ct. 2006). 
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constitute a nuisance; that injunctive relief is necessary to prevent 
irreparable injury; and that Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at 
law.”136 The court cited the law of anticipatory nuisance from the 
Alabama Code. Rather than directly address the University’s 
unreasonable use claim for groundwater, the court stated the 
nuisance doctrine was the controlling theory “in the context of 
property damage caused by a continuing activity involving the use of 
underground water.”137 Highlighting the difficulty any party has in 
proving anticipatory nuisance, the court said “the granting of 
anticipatory injunctive relief ‘is one of the extraordinary powers of 
the court, and should be cautiously and sparingly exercised.’”138 
Plaintiffs can only succeed on an anticipatory nuisance claim if they 
prove to a “reasonable degree certain” that a nuisance and 
irreversible damage will occur if the disputed activity is allowed.139 
The court framed the issue in the case as whether “the 
University’s Ebenezer Wetlands Preserve [can] co-exist with 
Middle Tennessee’s rock quarry operation.”140 The court weighed 
the scientific data and testimony of the plaintiff ’s and the 
defendant’s expert witnesses. The court found that “[o]nce the 
groundwater flow is changed or disturbed, these conditions can not 
simply be reversed. A broken and permeable subsurface can not be 
put back together.”141 The court granted the plaintiff ’s request for 
declaratory judgment and issued an injunction, with two caveats: 
First, “the existing ecological system of the Ebenezer Wetlands 
Preserve [must] remain[] inviolate,” and second, the University 




 136. Id. at 2. 
 137. Id. at 2–3 (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. at 3 (quoting St. James’ Church v. Arrington, 36 Ala. 546, 548 (1860)). 
 139.  Amended Complaint, supra note 116, at 36. 
 140. Order, supra note 135, at 4. 
 141. Supplemental Order at 2, Univ. of Montevallo Found. v. Middle Tenn. Land Dev. 
Co., No. CV-05-624 (Ala. 30th D. Cir. Ct. 2007). 
 142. Order, supra note 135, at 6. 
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D. Implications of University of Montevallo v. Middle Tennessee 
Land Development Co. LLC 
 
Not all isolated wetlands are as lucky as Ebenezer Preserve. If, as 
we have heard before, “bad facts make bad law,” then the case of 
Ebenezer may be one of “good facts making good law.” We need 
isolated wetland protections on a broader scale and in a more holistic 
fashion, yet very few isolated wetlands are owned by universities, 
have received federal monies, are used extensively for educational 
and research purposes, and are threatened by neighbors whose 
proposed use of their land is diametrically opposed to the wetland 
user, but whose actions would destroy the wetland. Indeed, the 
primary threats to isolated wetlands are typically the parties owning 
the property containing the wetland and who would like to develop 
it, as in SWANCC. Overall, protection of isolated wetlands through 
archaic common law claims, like anticipatory nuisance—an incredibly 
difficult claim to prove in the first instance—is not enough to protect 
these important national resources. 
The first normative argument this Article makes is that if state 
and local governments continue to refuse to protect isolated 
wetlands in a more holistic manner, then the federal government 
should establish a minimum standards framework for that protection. 
The second argument this Article makes is that, notwithstanding the 
low political likelihood of passing federal isolated wetlands 
regulation, a constitutional foundation for such legislation should be 
established to preemptively answer the “constitutional questions” 
that concerned the court in SWANCC and Rapanos.143 After all, 
political will can change in an instant. Commons analysis can help 
answer those constitutional questions in the case of isolated 
wetlands, as demonstrated in the next section. 
IV. COMMONS ANALYSIS SUPPORTS FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
ISOLATED WETLANDS UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A. Defining Commons 
Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons144 is a familiar tale, and 
 
 143. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 144. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
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one told with much iteration in this volume’s selection of articles. 
The tale ultimately details the plight of individuals who have access 
to a shared resource—a commons. Any individual is free to enter and 
consume resources from the commons, but each is also incentivized 
to “rationally” maximize personal economic gain by the continual 
consumption of resources. Though each individual gains the entire 
benefit of each unit of consumption, the negative, aggregated costs 
of consumption are spread among all individuals within the 
commons resource system. As a result, each individual engages in a 
simple cost-benefit analysis and determines that because individual 
returns will invariably outweigh individual costs it is always in the 
individual’s best interest to consume more resources. This individual 
behavior, however, is collectively deficient, and ultimately the 
resource is destroyed over time. 
Commons scholars have recognized a wide and growing number 
of resources that may be characterized as part of a commons and 
may be subject to tragedies of overuse and degradation. Early 
commons scholarship focused on “traditional” natural resources, 
such as fisheries, forests, groundwater aquifers, and the atmosphere. 
Yet scholars have highlighted a number of “new commons” in the 
form of medical care,145 parking spots, sidewalk vending, knowledge, 
government budgets, silence, email inboxes, and even presidential 
primaries.146 This scholarship has been further expanded to include 
systems of governance, like the U.S. federal system,147 and natural 
capital resource systems stretching across private properties.148 
Commons scholars have settled on two key elements defining 
commons resources: depletability and non-excludability. Robert 
Keohane and Elinor Ostrom characterize commons resources as 
“depletable natural or human-made resources from which potential 
beneficiaries are difficult to exclude,”149 while Oran Young 
 
 145. Michael Gochfeld et al., Medical Care as a Commons, in PROTECTING THE 
COMMONS 253, 253 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001). 
 146. Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. REV. 
899, 907 (2010). 
 147. See HUDSON, supra note 5. 
 148. Id. 
 149. LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 1, 13 (Robert O. Keohane & 
Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995) (citation omitted). Duncan Snidal posits that commons analysis 
“focuses on the provision and appropriation of goods that are not joint in consumption (like 
private goods) but where exclusion is difficult (like public goods). Standard cases are natural 
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describes them as resources used by a collection of “appropriators” 
where such resources are “both non-excludable and depletable.”150 
Other commons scholars describe commons resources as “natural 
or human-made resources in which (a) exclusion is non-trivial (but 
not necessarily impossible) and (b) yield is subtractable.”151 
In addition to the two basic elements of commons resources, 
the body of resources that make up the commons is known as a 
“resource system.”152 A resource system is comprised of 
“resource units,” which are defined as “what individuals 
appropriate or use from resource systems.”153 The process of 
withdrawing resource units from a resource system is called 
“appropriation” and those who withdraw resource units from 
the system are called “appropriators.”154 
B. Privatized Commons Resources as New Commons: Isolated Wetlands 
as Privatized Commons Resources 
Prior research has discussed at length how natural capital on 
private land meets the definitional requirements of a commons 
resource, and therefore may be considered a “new commons.”155 
This research described these resources as “privatized commons 
 
resources, like forests or water, where the quantity available is less than the desired 
consumption of potential appropriators.” Duncan Snidal, The Politics of Scope: Endogenous 
Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 
47, 50 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995). 
 150. Oran R. Young, The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships, in 
LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE 27, 29 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor 
Ostrom eds., 1995) (citation omitted). 
 151. Steven Hackett et al., Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: 
Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL 
INTERDEPENDENCE 93, 95 (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995) 
(citation omitted). 
 152. Ostrom highlights fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, irrigation 
canals, bridges, parking garages, mainframe computers, streams, lakes, oceans, and other 
bodies of water as examples of “resource systems.” ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (James E. Alt & 
Douglass C. North eds., 1990). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. Ostrom gives a variety of examples of appropriators, such as “herders, fishers, 
irrigators, commuters, and anyone else who appropriates resource units from some type of 
resource system.” Id. at 31. 
 155. See HUDSON, supra note 5, at 13. 
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resources,”156 which are depletable and it is very difficult, in the 
absence of government regulation, to exclude any private property 
owner from appropriating their resource unit of natural capital from 
the resource system157 that is a collection of private properties.158 
Perhaps the only means of doing so is bringing a common law claim 
that a neighboring property owner’s removal of natural capital 
constitutes a nuisance, as Middle Tennessee’s removal of water 
would have been according to the Shelby County Circuit Court. 
Consider the many different types of resource systems described 
by Ostrom: fishing grounds, groundwater basins, grazing areas, 
irrigation canals, bridges, parking garages, mainframe computers, 
streams, lakes, oceans, and other bodies of water.159 A collection of 
private properties is yet another resource system, containing vast 
 
 156. See Hudson, supra note 85, at 377. 
 157. Ostrom notes that resource units “are not subject to joint use or appropriation.” 
OSTROM, supra note 152, at 31. This is an important distinction, because it means that 
appropriators can exclude other appropriators from the resource unit itself. In this way, private 
property may operate as a commons since private property owners can certainly exclude other 
parties from the resource unit of natural capital over which they maintain control. The non-
excludability requirement is met, however, because it is exceedingly difficult to exclude other 
appropriators from the resource system—that is, from the natural capital on the collection of 
private properties and from its appropriation by individual property owners. 
 158. Some might argue that there is a distinguishing factor between a traditional, “true” 
commons and natural capital on private lands, namely that with regard to the former no one 
person has a legal entitlement to prevent anyone else from coming onto the land and removing 
natural capital, whereas in the latter a number of people do maintain such rights. Another way 
to frame the latter person’s right, however, is that the right to prevent another party’s removal 
of natural capital from their land is ancillary to their right to exclude someone’s physical 
presence from their property. Furthermore, though property owners maintain a legal right to 
exclude others from their property, they do not maintain an unfettered legal right to 
appropriate natural capital on their land, as those resources provide public goods across 
property lines. Thus, there is a moral obligation and limitation inherent in ownership of 
property, at least with regard to appropriation of natural capital—even in the absence of 
affirmative legal protections. Consider the scenario where everyone removed all of the forests 
and other natural capital from their land in the southeastern United States, where there are no 
prescriptive limitations on forest clearing (but for those arising tangentially related to 
obligations under the Endangered Species Act or other similar federal or state regulations). 
This would clearly be unacceptable and would have untold ramifications for water quality, 
biodiversity, and climate regulation, among a variety of other ills. Indeed, the idea of moral 
obligation’s relation to property rights has received a robust theorization recently by Peter 
Gerhart. See GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY (2014). This topic is also the 
subject of one of our (Hudson) forthcoming articles. See Blake Hudson, Moral Obligation and 
Natural Capital Commons on Private Property, Perspectives on Peter Gerhart’s Property Law 
and Social Morality, 2 TEX. A&M J. OF REAL PROP. L. (forthcoming 2015). 
 159. OSTROM, supra note 152, at 30. 
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quantities of natural capital subject to private property rights. The 
“resource units” making up the system are the privatized commons 
resources on individual parcels of private property. Thus, the 
property containing Ebenezer Preserve contains one resource unit 
of natural capital, over which the University maintains control, 
while Middle Tennessee’s property contains another. Within a 
collection of private properties, we can see that developers, such as 
quarry operators, are appropriators in the business of appropriating 
natural capital, most often removing it in the process of creating 
human-made capital. This, of course, can affect the rights of other 
appropriators, such as the University. Ultimately, though private 
property rights in land are “unitized, quantified, and salable,” the 
natural capital within a given environment is a resource system 
“owned in common” by the collection of rational private property 
owners in a given area.160 
The term “privatized commons resources” includes two 
categories of resources: “(1) natural resources contained on land 
(wetlands, endangered species, or other resources that constitute 
natural capital) that are appropriated by economic development 
(retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, etc.) and (2) resources 
appropriated by individuals and tied to an interstate market (wheat, 
marijuana, or other resources that constitute natural capital 
commodities).”161 The filling in or draining of isolated wetlands for 
economic development clearly falls within the first category. Why is 
this categorization of isolated wetlands important? Because the 
primary test used to determine the constitutionality of federal 
environmental legislation—the substantial effects test—deems 
constitutional federal regulation of “objects” that are economic in 
nature. These activities may be grouped to determine if there will be 
an aggregate effect on interstate commerce (known as “the 
aggregation principle”).162 In turn, commons analysis helps 
determine when resources like isolated wetlands (resource units of 
natural capital appropriated by individual appropriators from the 
broader resource system) are objects of regulation that are of an 
economic character. As described below, any time an appropriator 
 
 160. See id. at 13. 
 161. See Hudson, supra note 85, at 377 n.8. 
 162. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). 
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engaged directly in interstate commerce appropriates resource units 
of natural capital from a resource system of private properties, even if 
completely intrastate, this act of appropriation is the “object” of 
regulation that in the aggregate must substantially affect interstate 
commerce. It is economic in nature because the appropriator 
maintains clear ties to interstate commerce. 
Though perhaps inconsistent in outcome, key cases describing 
the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause, such as 
Wickard v. Filburn,163 United States v. Lopez,164 United States v. 
Morrison,165 and Gonzalez v. Raich,166 have been quite consistent 
with regard to at least one legal point: they each validated the 
constitutional viability of federal legislation directed toward intrastate 
economic activities, finding that those activities could be aggregated 
and regulated as substantially affecting interstate commerce.167 The 
reason the legislation failed in Lopez and Morrison,168 and why 
Commerce Clause authority was not sufficient to sustain the 
individual mandate portion of “Obamacare” in the more recent 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius case,169 was 
because the intrastate “object” of regulation in those cases was 
characterized as non-economic in nature (that is, carrying a gun near 
a school, engaging in domestic violence, or refusing to purchase 
healthcare).170 Appropriating depletable, non-excludable resources 
while engaged in an economic endeavor, or introducing depletable, 
non-excludable resources into an economic market, however, are 
inherently economic activities. The Wickard Court made clear, as 
 
 163. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 164. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 165. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 166. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 167. In Raich, Justice Stevens highlighted a unifying theme of Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence: “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local 
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 17 (citation omitted). 
 168. In Raich, Justice Stevens distinguished Lopez and Morrison from cases upholding 
federal statutes under the Commerce Clause by finding that neither dealt with regulation of 
activities that were “quintessentially economic.” 545 U.S. at 25. 
 169. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012). 
 170. Justice Roberts characterized the activity Congress was choosing to regulate as 
“doing nothing,” and refusing to enter into an economic transaction. Id. As a result, the 
activity Congress was regulating was non-economic. See id. 
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supported by Commerce Clause cases since, that intrastate 
consumption of privatized commons resources (like wheat grown on 
one’s own property)—even if not directly entering an established 
commercial market—is economic activity that can be aggregated for 
the purpose of finding a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Consider the following: 
A commons is itself a principle of aggregation, because the 
resources present in the commons are naturally aggregated. The 
aggregate effects of each herder maximizing economic return and 
appropriating as much grass as possible from the pasture results in a 
reduction of resources all across the commons—leading to its 
potential destruction. . . . Thus the appropriation of privatized 
commons resources by one party, regardless of the nature of the 
use (e.g., commercial versus home consumption of wheat or 
marijuana) or the geopolitical or private property boundaries 
separating appropriators, substantially affects the economic 
transactions of other appropriators, i.e., “commerce.”171 
The reason the Court in SWANCC and Rapanos172 was 
concerned about “constitutional questions” over federal authority to 
regulate isolated wetlands was because the Court was unsure of what 
exactly constituted the “object of regulation” that in the aggregate 
must “substantially affect” interstate commerce.173 Courts have 
indicated that this question is important because it informs whether 
the intrastate activity can appropriately be considered “economic” so 
that it can then be aggregated under the substantial effects test. 
Scholars have argued that, “a court cannot resolve whether an object 
or activity is economic or non-economic without identifying what 
that object or activity is.”174 The Court in SWANCC implied “that if 
 
 171. Hudson, supra note 85, at 419. 
 172. The Court in SWANCC stated that to answer the constitutional questions presented 
in that case would require an evaluation of “the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.” 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001). 
 173. Bradford Mank argued “a court must determine the central or ‘precise’ ‘object’ of a 
regulatory statute,” and “how close the nexus must be between the object and the commercial 
purposes of the Commerce Clause.” Bradford C. Mank, After Gonzales v. Raich: Is the 
Endangered Species Act Constitutional Under the Commerce Clause?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 375, 
403 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
 174. Id. (quoting David W. Scopp, Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species 
Act: The Rehnquist Court’s Web of Confusion Traps More Than the Fly, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 
801 (2005)). 
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the ‘object’ that must substantially affect interstate commerce was 
the simple filling of an isolated gravel pit home to migratory birds, 
severed from any broader economic activity related to interstate 
commerce, then the application of the Commerce Clause might be 
in doubt.”175 
The “object of regulation” question has resulted in 
disagreements in legal analysis among courts on a wide array of 
environmental subjects. For example, under the CWA, should 
wetlands themselves or rather commercial activities impacting those 
wetlands be considered the focus of the statute?176 Similarly, legal 
analysis on the question is split among U.S. appellate courts 
regarding the appropriate justification for upholding the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). Appellate courts considering Commerce Clause 
challenges to the ESA have consistently upheld the statute,177 but the 
courts have been unable to formulate a consistent legal basis for 
doing so.178 These courts are split over whether the ESA regulates 
the actual taking of protected species or the commercial activities 
resulting in the taking of species.179 In Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 
for example, the D.C. Court of Appeals held then-Judge Roberts’s 
“hapless toad”180 was not the “object of regulation” under the 
 
 175. Hudson, supra note 85, at 423. The SWANCC Court stated that the “object” of 
regulation was “not clear, for although the Corps has claimed jurisdiction over petitioner’s 
land because it contains water areas used as habitat by migratory birds, respondents now, post 
litem motam, focus upon the fact that the regulated activity is petitioner’s municipal landfill, 
which is ‘plainly of a commercial nature.’” 531 U.S. at 173. 
 176. See Michael J. Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 
2143, 2163 (2002); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003). 
 177. Indeed, federal courts in general have been reluctant to rely on Lopez and Morrison 
to strike down environmental regulations. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 273 (3d ed. 2006). For a more recent update on courts of appeals’ 
treatment of the ESA specifically, see Robert Thornton, 9th Circuit Rejects Commerce Clause 




 178. Mollie Lee, Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce 
Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456, 471–75 (2006); Mank, supra note 173, at 428. 
 179. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered 
Species Under the Commerce Clause, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923 (2004). 
 180. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting) (rehearing denied). 
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ESA.181 Instead, the court found the “regulated activity is Rancho 
Viejo’s planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it 
threatens.”182 In contrast, in GDF Realty Investments v. Norton,183 
the Fifth Circuit held the economic impact of the development is not 
the appropriate focus of ESA regulation, but rather the 
“interdependence” of endangered species themselves, which has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce when aggregated.184 
Professor Mank has argued this jurisdictional split is problematic, 
because “[t]he [Supreme] Court’s failure to define what objects or 
activities are most important in analyzing whether a statutory scheme 
may regulate an activity under the Commerce Clause has caused 
especially difficult problems for courts deciding whether the ESA is 
constitutional under the [Commerce] Clause.”185 Mank argues that 
the jurisdictional split has significant implications because: 
If a court focuses on the ESA’s means in regulating the economic 
impact of the activities that harm endangered species, then the 
government likely can regulate large scale construction projects, 
but not a lone hiker walking through a forest or perhaps even 
individual homeowners, although in the aggregate both types of 
activities could cause significant harm to these species. . . . By 
contrast, under the rationale of GDF, the government could 
regulate a lone hiker or landscaping homeowner who harms any 
endangered species, no matter how insignificant, because the loss 
of any endangered species threatens the delicate balance of 
ecosystems, and harm to ecosystems would cause substantial harms 
to interstate commerce.186 
Professor Mank further argues:  
SWANCC itself failed to provide a clear answer about how lower 
courts should decide what is the central ‘object’ of a statute—either 
the statute’s regulatory ‘targets’ or its beneficiaries—and how close 
the relationship must be between the object of the statute and the 
 
 181. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1071–72 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 182. Id. at 1072. 
 183. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 184. Id. at 640. 
 185. Mank, supra note 173, at 405 (footnote omitted). 
 186. Mank, supra note 179, at 926–27 (footnotes omitted). 
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commercial purposes of the Commerce Clause.187 
Commons analysis, however, provides a clear framework within 
which to analyze the “object of regulation” for legislation aimed at 
natural capital. The “interdependence” approach of the Fifth Circuit 
and the “commercial development” approach of the D.C. Circuit 
cannot logically be separated under the commons appropriation 
analysis. As noted in prior scholarship: 
Regulation of commons resources cannot be separated into 
regulation of either the appropriator or the resource being 
appropriated. One need only look at the structure of the statutes to 
determine that wetlands, endangered species, uncontaminated 
land, air, and other resources are inseparable from the activities 
impacting them—without this interaction there would be no 
regulation in the first instance. A developer, for example, is an 
appropriator of the wetlands resource . . . and the substantial 
effects on interstate commerce arise out of the act of 
appropriation . . . . [T]he appropriation substantially affecting 
interstate commerce is impossible without the constituent sub-
elements of an appropriator (the developer) as well as that being 
appropriated (the wetlands . . .). In other words, the “object or 
activity” of regulations like the ESA and CWA is the entire act of 
appropriation . . . . It is this act of appropriation that in the 
aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce.188 
Under this analysis, if the appropriator is an entity that would 
otherwise be considered engaged in interstate commerce, such as a 
real estate developer, quarry operator, or otherwise, then this 
designation automatically makes the act of appropriation189 an 
economic activity, and thus aggregable under the substantial effects 
test. The appropriation is aggregable regardless of whether the 
resource is completely intrastate, as are isolated wetlands. This 
 
 187. Id. at 929 (footnote omitted). 
 188. Hudson, supra note 85, at 426. The D.C. Circuit in National Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), recognized the commons nature of 
endangered species when it applied the aggregation doctrine to uphold application of the ESA. 
The court stated that “[i]n the aggregate . . . we can be certain that the extinction of species 
and the attendant decline in biodiversity will have a real and predictable effect on interstate 
commerce,” id. at 1053–54, and “we know that in the aggregate the extinction of endangered 
species will have a substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . .”, id. at 1053 n.14. 
 189. Appropriation by that appropriator of the resource unit of natural capital over which 
they maintain control. 
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analysis, of course, may not help with the question of how to treat 
the “lone hiker in the woods” or the individual property owner who 
wants to fill an isolated wetland to make a baseball diamond or a 
homemade playground for his or her children. But the primary 
threats to isolated wetlands come not from landowners making 
baseball diamonds and playgrounds, but rather from traditional 
economic activities engaged in by actors with clear ties to interstate 
commerce, such as retail, housing, industrial, agricultural, or other 
developers. Thus a commons analysis renders most of the threats to 
isolated wetlands and other intrastate resources traditionally 
considered outside the ambit of federal constitutional authority 
reachable by the federal government under current understandings 
of the substantial effects test. In this way, a commons analysis 
facilitates reconciliation of the varied past rationales of the circuit 
courts so that constitutional tests can be applied in a clearer fashion 
to future federal environmental legislation. 
Specifically in the case of isolated wetlands, commons analysis 
lays the framework for the constitutionality of federal isolated 
wetlands regulation. Such regulation, if aimed at regulating or 
prohibiting the filling of isolated wetlands by retail, housing, 
industrial, agricultural, or other development (an act of 
appropriation of individual resource units defined by property 
boundaries), would be regulating an object that is economic in 
nature—by way of the appropriator’s ties to interstate commerce. 
Therefore, even though the wetlands may be completely intrastate 
and bear no apparent relation to traditional navigable waters,190 
regulation of wetlands at the federal level would be constitutional.191 
 
 190. Though any hydrologist will tell you there are always connections between 
seemingly isolated waters and the entire hydrological system. 
 191. An important aspect of the site chosen in the case of Ebenezer Preserve was that the 
out of state company that sought to develop it purchased it effectively as mere land 
speculation. This raises interesting questions regarding the Commerce Clause because we often 
look at land use planning as merely a state or local affair—seemingly one justification for 
leaving land use regulation out of the ambit of prescriptive federal inputs. Yet, though the use 
to which the land may be put is wholly intrastate, there is a land development market that will 
always be interstate in nature. In other words, instead of just focusing on the character of the 
land in question or the use to which the land will be put, one way to frame these development 
activities is as part of a larger interstate market of land speculation and sales. Most of those 
sales may occur within an individual state and between residents of that state, just as most of 
the wheat sold in a wheat producing state may be purchased by citizens within that state. See 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 130 (1942). As with the case of Ebenezer Swamp, however, 
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CONCLUSION 
Isolated wetlands are of great value to the nation, though 
severely overlooked in natural resource management policy at local, 
state, and federal levels. Wetlands like Ebenezer Preserve need 
greater protection than what is currently provided by federal 
statutes aimed at water quality with unclear jurisdictional reach (the 
CWA 404 program) or state common law doctrines like 
anticipatory nuisance that are difficult to prove and are of limited 
utility under most factual circumstances. This Article is not calling 
for vast centralization of wetland policy at the federal level. Indeed, 
a number of problems plague over-centralization of natural 
resource management.192 The problem is that over-decentralization 
is as great of a threat, if not more, to responsible resource 
management.193 “Dynamic federalism” interaction among federal, 
state, and local governments is greatly needed to address threats to 
isolated wetlands and other natural resources.194 In the absence of 
adequate state and local standards, a minimum standards 
framework at the federal level is needed—a framework within which 
state and local governments can harness the benefits of 
decentralized governance while still maintaining the proper 
incentives to protect resources rather than indiscriminately 
appropriate them. Commons analysis demonstrates such a 
framework would be constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
What is a commons but an aggregated economic system whereby 
one appropriator’s utilization of resources directly and substantially 
affects the availability of those resources to rival appropriators? This 
is the essence of the Commerce Clause’s substantial effects test. 
When appropriators engaged in interstate commerce, like quarry 
developers, appropriate resources like isolated wetlands, this 
economic act of appropriation is one that in the aggregate affects 
interstate commerce and the environmental well-being of the 
nation—both present and future generations. 
 
other parties may be coming from out of state to purchase goods (i.e. land) in that market, 
develop it, and sell it for a profit. This is inherently interstate commerce. 
 192. See Jonathan Adler, Let Fifty Flowers Bloom: Environmental Federalism for the 21st 
Century (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 193. See HUDSON, supra note 5. 
 194. See id. at ch. 5. 
